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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
TAXATION
Jurisdiction
During the past year several Ohlo Supreme Court decisions presented
variations of the century-old problem of state taxation of the instrumen-
talities of the United States Government, which is controlled fundamentally
by the historic decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.'
Under the Ohio Revised Code all money, credit, deposits and other
property of persons residing in Ohio are subject to taxation generally.2 The
Code also authorizes the assessment and taxation of all shares of stock in a
financial institution located in Ohio whether or not the capital is divided
into shares held by the owners or even if no capital stock has been issued.3
The book valuation of the stock is assessed in the name of the financial
institution.
4
Three supreme court decisions were concerned with a common problem
namely, whether the value of federal securities held as part of the assets of
a financial institution should be included in the determination of the assess-
ment of the shareholders' interests.
The first case2 considered this problem in the light of whether the
legislature intended to exclude from the assets of a taxable financial insti-
tution, as defined by the Revised Code,6 the valuation attributable to such
securities held by the financial institution. It was held therein that the
General Assembly did not intend to exclude them, thereby subjecting the in-
terests of shareholders to assessment at book value without any diminution
for that proportion attributable to federal securities.
Such a ruling is in line with an early supreme court decision7 which
held that the State in assessing shares of capital stock need not deduct the
value of United States bonds owned and held by a corporation from the
total corporate resources in order to ascertain the value of each share. The
Supreme Court of the United States in affirming this early decision, noted
that there is a distinction between the property of the corporation repre-
14 Wheat (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
2 Otio REV. CODE § 5709.02. Such property is subject to taxation at the appro-
priate rates set forth in Ohio Revised Code Sections 5707.03, 5707.04.
SOMIO REV. CODE § 5725.04.
'OHIO REV. CODE § 5725.07.
'Broadview Savings and Loan Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 119, 118 N.E.2d 665
(1954).
'OHIo REV. CODE §§ 5725..04 (as to shares) and 5725.03 (as to deposits), at the
rates specified in sections 5707.03, .04.
"Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 Ohio St. 266, 56 N.E. 1036 (1900)
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sented by its capital stock and the property of the shareholders represented
by their shares.8
The second case 9 construed the phraseology "the capital employed, or
the property representing it, in a financial institution the capital of which
is not divided into shares, or which has no capital stock"'0 as referring to the
capital of and belonging to the owners which was employed in the institu-
tion. It was the opinion of the majority of the supreme court that the
value of federal securities held by a financial institution need not be de-
ducted in ascertaining the valuation of the ownership interests of the de-
positors in a financial institution for intangible tax purposes under the
Revised Code."
The third case was concerned with taxation of withdrawable shares as
deposits and on the capital employed, or the property representing it in a
federally incorporated savings and loan association -.1  The supreme court
adhered to its stated position in the Soczety for Savngs13 case discussed
above, in holding the share and capital employed taxable at their aggregate
value without diminution by the value of federal securities held by the
financial institution. The court also rejected an argument that the appel-
lant's shares were exempt from taxation as constituting an instrumentality
of the federal government and also the argument that the same rule must be
applied to taxation of shares of incorporated institutions as is applied to
the taxation of the owners of an unincorporated financial institution.'4
While not so designating it, a supreme court decision was concerned
fundamentally with the constitutional limits of taxation under the sales tax.
'Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U.S. 111, 22 Sup. Ct. 394 (1902).
'Society for Savings v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 122, 118 N.E.2d 651 (1954); probable
iurisdiction noted, 75 Sup. Ct. 49 (1954)
"OHIO REV. CODE § 5725.04.
"The majority of the court was not impressed with the argument that the tax was
not upon the ownership of capital invested in a financial institution based upon
the want of statutory provision for the corporation which is required to pay the tax,
passing it on to those whose property interests are taxed.
The gist of the majority position is that it is ownership interests of the depositors
in the corporation, and not any capital or property of or belonging to the corporation,
which are the properties to be taxed pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code Section
5725.04, assessed pursuant to Section 5725.07, and taxes at the two-mill rates
specified in Section 5707.03 (D)
Judge Stewart agreed with the court's position as to the taxation of "shares" but
dissented vigorously from the majority position on the taxation of capital employed,
or property representing it, valuing such interest without deducting therefrom any
federal securities contained therein.
"First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 149, 118 N.E.2d 667
(1954); probable iurzsdicton noted, 75 Sup. Ct. 49 (1954).
" 161 Ohio St. 122, 118 N.E.2d 651 (1954).
4 Judge Stewart again dissented on the issue of "capital employed."
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It was held that motor vehicles purchased outside of Ohio for use outside of
the State where the Ohio vendor received the vehicles in Ohio solely for the
purpose of sale to the out-of-state vendee and where each step in the transac-
tion disclosed that purpose, were not subject to the Ohio sales tax. 5
Another supreme court decision was concerned with the fact of doing
business within a municipality sufficient to render the businessman sub-
ject to the licensing authority of the municipality.' 6 The City of Cincinnati
was not allowed to apply its licensing authority to a taxi operator who ope-
rated cabs physically from a point without Cincinnati, hauling passengers
from its regular place of business into the city, but accepting no business or
passengers within its limits. The taxi operator was not subject to Cincin-
nati's licensing authority merely because of the fact that he maintained a
telephone in Cincinnati from which calls were relayed to its place of busi-
ness beyond the city limits.
Exemptions
The General Assembly has exempted 17 from taxation public property
used exclusively for a public purpose under the power visited in it by
Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. One supreme court de-
cision denied such exemption when property was leased on a non-profit
basis to a non-profit corporation for the purpose of promoting public en-
tertainment, staging of public and private events, and the leasing to others
of concession privileges. To exempt public property there must be owner-
ship and a dedication to an exclusively public purpose.'
General Property
The reported cases in this area dealt with real property exemptions and
the redemption of forfeited lands. In Welfare Federation of Cleveland v.
Peck'" the supreme court had before it a question of the split-listing of a
'Kelly Motors, Inc. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 186, 118 N.E.2d 408 (1954).
The relevant Revised Code Sections are 5739.02 and 4505.06. The former does
not directly describe the factual situation, but by citing it the Court must have had
reference to the exemptions portions (B) (11) "Sales not within the taxing power
of this state under the Constitution of the United States." This is also indicated by
the following quotation from the Court's opinion: "Too much of this transaction
occurred outside this state to hold that the purchase was completed in Ohio."
The other Section, 4505.06, is more explicit, requiring the clerk of courts to
issue a certificate of title without payment of tax or evidence of payment "(E) When
the motor vehicle was purchased outside of this state for use outside this state."
"Mariemont Taxi, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 162 Ohio St. 163, 122 N.E.2d 400 (1954).
27 Orno REv. CoDE § 5709.08.
'Board of Park Com'rs. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 160 Ohio St. 451, 116 N.E.2d
725 (1954).
" 160 Ohio St. 509, 117 N.E.2d 1 (1954).
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building having a single ownership for purposes of tax exemption. It ap-
peared that nine floors of an eleven story building were used exclusively for
charitable purposes. Applying the "separate entity" concept of the Re-
vised Code,2° the supreme court held that the separation could be effected
on a horizontal plane separating the two lower floors from the remainder
which was being used exclusively for charitable purposes. This decision is
a natural extension of the position of the court in the recent case of Trustees
of the Church of God v. Board of Tax Appeals.21
The two cases concerning forfeited lands dealt with problems of the
amount of payments for redemption and the proper parties to claim redemp-
tion. The Revised Code Provision authorizing redemption of forfeited
lands at any time before disposition by the State, requires payment of all
the taxes, assessments, penalties and interest due thereon at the time of
payment.22 As applied to a delinquency which began before 1936, the
court was concerned with whether this section applied exclusively or
whether Revised Code Section 323.42 which defines the maxinum amount
which shall be tendered in redemption, fixes the maximum which may be
required by the county treasurer. The court held that a tender of a sum
equal to 100 per cent of the principal sum of taxes and assessments, less
penalties, interest, and other charges for 1936 and prior years, plus penalties,
interest and other charges for 1937 and all years subsequent, to the year of
payment, is sufficient. 23 The court applied the Code section cited above
as controlling the maxunum amount.
In the second case the court held that a mortgagee does not qualify as a
"former owner" within the meaning of the redemption statute.2  The
mortgagee must obtain the property in foreclosure proceedings or otherwise
extinguish the right of the mortgagor to redeem or obtain possession by
ejectment after the condition is broken in order to qualify as "a former
owner" within the meaning of the statute. 25
Tangible Personal Property
The reported cases were concerned with property and persons subject to
the tax and with certain questions relative to the valuation of tangible
personal property.
In 1948 and 1949, the B. F. Goodrich Company, a New York corpora-
tion authorized to do business in Ohio, did not return tangible personal
20 OHIO REV. CODE § 5713.04.
" 159 Ohio St. 517, 112 N.E.2d 633 (1953).
"OHio REV. CODE § 5723.03
"State ex rel, Fodor v. Monroe, 160 Ohio St. 495, 117 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
"Levin v. Carney, 161 Ohio St. 513, 120 N.E.2d 92 (1954).
"OHIO REV. CODE § 5723.03. The opinion of the court describes the situation
(Spring
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property, including 'tire cord material, which was stored in an Ohio ware-
house operated by the company. The company acted in reliance upon a
Code section which excluded property, not used in business in Ohio, by a
non-resident if held in a storage warehouse in Ohio for storage only. The
tax commissioner included this property as personal property of the ap-
pellee subject to taxation. The supreme court affirmed the reversal by the
Board of Tax Appeals of the commissione's ruling.2 6 First, pointing out
that the taxpayer is entitled to have any ambiguity in the taxing statute
resolved in his favor, the court decided that a corporation incorporated
under the laws of a foreign state will be included within the word "non-
resident" in the taxing statute; and, second that property held for storage
only is nevertheless within the excluslon 27 even though its owner intended
at some later time to sell it or use it as manufacturing material.
A second case2s dealt with the statutory definition of tangible personal
property which expressly excluded patterns, jigs, dies and drawings from
the things included therein. 29 The tax commissioner contended that the
mentioned items were includable as elements of valuation of the manu-
facturing inventory for personal property tax purposes, but the court held
that the language of the statute is unambiguous, and that the items are to
be excluded for every purpose of personal property taxation.
What attachments to a motor vehicle are subject to the tangible per-
sonal property tax? This question was presented by a taxicab operator
which had installed meters and two-way radios in its motor vehicles. The
answer to this question involves a construction of the code section which
exempts motor vehicles from the tangible personal property tax.30 A
majority of the supreme court held that articles added to a motor vehicle
for the purpose of facilitating the operation of a taxicab business are not
integral parts of the vehicles and are therefore not exempt from the per-
sonal property tax.31
Two supreme court decisions presented interesting question of the
valuation of personal property. In the Willard Storage Battery case,32 the
generally as follows: "It must, therefore, be held under Section 5746, General Code
(Section 5723.03, Revised Code) that the term, 'former owner or owners, does not
include a mortgagee of mortgaged property where the mortgagor has not been di-
vested of his fee by legal proceedings."
'B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 118 N.E.2d 525 (1954)
"OMo REV. CODE § 5701.08.
' Goodyear Aircraft Corp v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 200, 122 N.E.2d 700 (1954)
2a0o R]V. CODE § 5701.03.
"Exemption of motor vehicles from personal property tax is provided by Ohio Re-
vised Code Section 5701.03 and 4503.04.
'Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc., v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 508, 120 N.E.2d 86 (1954).
"
2Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St., 197, 118 N.E.2d 514 (1954).
19551
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
taxpayer had valued its lead inventory at cost rather than market value on
its monthly valuations of inventory under the Code.3 3 The taxpayer in-
sisted, however, that the price of lead had increased out of proportion to the
general commodity price level increase in a comparable period of time, and
that its actual cost should be reduced on a formula basis. The taxing au-
thority refused a reduction but accepted the inventory valuation returned
by the taxpayer without considering the actual market value of lead on the
various valuation dates. The court rejected the taxpayer's request for a
proportionate valuation, pointing out that under the statute actual market
price is the best evidence of true value, and ordered the taxing authorities
to take into consideration current market prices in determining the true
value of the lead inventory
The other valuation case34 dealt with the application of a published
directive of the Department of Taxation providing for a straight-line de-
preciation percentage to be applied to the original cost of personal property
in determining the true value of personal property used in certain industries.
The Department of Taxation took the position that its directive must be
applied regardless of any evidence as to the actual life of industrial equip-
ment. While agreeing with the use of the directive in the ascertainment of
true value, the court held that the taxing authority is required to ascertain
from the evidence whether in a particular case the application of the di-
rective will produce an unreasonable result. Such directives establishing
depreciation rates are prima facie authority only and they are subject to
adjustment in all cases where special or unusual circumstances or conditions
of use are shown to exist. All relevant evidence bearing upon actual de-
preciation must therefore be received and weighted by the valuing authority.
Intangible Personal Property
Several of the supreme court decisions under the Ohio intangible per-
sonal property tax were concerned with the proper classification of a
particular item of property. While the Revised Code defines royalties
received from patents as investments, 3 not all payments flowing from
contracts concerning patents are royalties subject to the intangibles tax."0
In Taylor v. Peck37 the court held that annual payments of a percentage of
the net corporate sales to a patent owner during his lifetime in return for
the assignment of such patents were not income from royalties or invest-
' OHio REV. CODE §5 5711.18 and 5711.22.
a'W L. Harper Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 300, 118 N.E.2d 643 (1954)
"OHIO REV. CODE § 5701.06 (C)
Q*OHIo REv. CODE § 5707.04 (A)
' 160 Ohio St. 288, 116 N.E.2d 417 (1953)
(Spring
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ments but rather consideration for the transfer of a capital investment.
Investments include evidences of indebtedness, whether negotiable or
not,3 s but not all income produced pursuant to contract is deemed to flow
from an investment. Thus, "investments" do not include a lease of tangible
personal property under which the lessor received rental or other compensa-
tion, and the lessor of trolley coaches which receives lease income from the
lessee under a written contract is not required to make an intangible tax re-
turn of the lease or of the rental income received thereunder."9
"Accounts receivable" and "accounts payable" 40 are unportant terms
under the intangibles tax. One supreme court decision considers the status
of renegotiation refunds due from a contractor to the United States. In
Eastern Machnery Co. v. Pock,41 the court ruled that such refunds demanded
from the contractor-taxpayer were "accounts payable" for determining tax
credit even though there was an appeal pending from the administrative
determination. But, accounts owing a contractor by a federal department
which are seized under United States statutes and applied as payment on
a renegotiation refund due on a separate contract are not "accounts receiva-
ble" or "taxable intangibles" under the Revised Code. 2
In an interesting case concerning the tax consequences of a 100%
stock split at the very end of the year, the tax commissioner had treated the
additional shares received by the taxpayer without additional consideration
as non-income producing investments. 3 The court, pointing out that the
tax is based on the value of the investment in stock and that the taxpayer's
investment after the split was no different from that before the issuance of
the new shares, held that the income yield for tax purposes for the year of
the split was produced by the entire issue of stock, that is, all of the stock
held after the split was non-income producing.44
Are amounts held on tax day by a bank to redeem certified checks taxable
as deposits under the Code?45 After certification, the drawer of the check
does not have the amount covered by the check on deposit since the amount
represented by the check is no longer a "deposit." Nor does the mere
holder of the certified check become a "depositor" by virtue of the accept-
nO8o REV. CODE § 5701.06 (B).
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 73, 118 N.E.2d
142 (1954).
'0 Oi1o REv. CODE § 5701.07
4 161 Ohio St. 1, 117 N.E.2d 593 (1954).
OH1O REV. CODE § 5701.07 (accounts receivable); OIo REV. CODE § 5701.09
(taxable intangibles).
'
3 O8o REv. CODE § 5711.22.
"Marsh v. Peck, 162 Oh1o St. 11, 120 N.E.2d 428 (1954).
45OHIo REV. CODE § 5701.05.
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ance of the certified check. The supreme court 6 held that these amounts
set aside to pay certified checks are not taxable deposits and are not in-
cludable in the bank's report of taxable deposits.47
Sales and Use Taxes
As previously pointed out in this article,"' the supreme court held that
the Ohio sales tax did not apply to motor vehicles purchased outside of
Ohio for use outside of the state even though the vehicles were physically
moved through Ohio and Ohio title certificates were obtained.49
A considerable number of decisions dealt with the problem of non-
retail sales. Technically, these issues arise from attempts to apply the
statutory concept of a "retail sale" to specific factual situations. The Re-
vised Code excludes from the definition of "covered sales" certain personal
property transferred for the purposes of use or consumption in the produc-
tion of tangible personal property for sale, and property used directly in the
making of retail sales or directly in the rendition of a public-utility ser-
vice.50
Thus drilling and blasting equipment used by a contractor for the pur-
pose of loosening and breaking up mineral material subsequently offered for
sale was considered used in the production of tangible personal property,
although the property in question was not owned or sold by the consumer-
blasting contractor.5' On the other hand, trucks used by a mine operator in
removing slag and other non-marketable materials from the scene were not
used directly in the production of tangible personal property, and were
therefore taxable.52 Materials used or consumed by a railroad in the con-
struction of a required passenger station and its appurtenances were not
" First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 64, 120 N.E.2d 725
(1954)
"The report is required by Ohio Revised Code, Section 5725.02, and the tax is pre-
scribed by Sections 5709.02 and 5707.03.
" See the section on JURISDICTION, supra.
"Kelly Motors, Inc. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 186, 118 N.E.2d 408 (1954).
" OHIO REV. CODE 5 5739.01 (E) (2)
"Apex Power Corp. v. Peck, 162 Ohio St. 189, 122 N.E.2d 693 (1954).
" Powhatan Mining Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 389, 116 N.E.2d 426 (1953) Judge
Middleton dissented from the decision. His opinion expresses the view that the court
has been considering the manufacturing process as terminated too soon. He felt that
the removal of the finished article from the end of the production line was imperative
and that equipment used in the process is used directly in the production of tangible
personal property by manufacturing. He also felt in the instant case that the trucks
used exclusively in the removal of the "gob" or waste materials of the ultimate nmn-
ing process were definitely used in the manufacturing operation.
[spring
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"sold at retail" within the meaning of the statute excluding sales of goods
used directly in the rendition of a public-utility service."
The Revised Code54 defines a "sale" as including a construction con-
tract providing for the incorporation of tangible personal property into a
structure or improvement on and becoming a part of real property when-
ever the consideration for such incorporation is charged or paid separately
from the consideration for the performance of the other obligations of the
construction contract. The supreme court held that an incorporation
agreement which does not call for a separate charge is not a sale within the
meamng of the statute, and therefore the contractor-purchaser of property is
a consumer within the meaning of the statute, and is taxable. 5
The Code outlines the relative liabilities of the vendor and consumer in
the collection and payment of the sales tax, imposing the legal duty of col-
lecting the sales tax and liability of failure to collect it on the vendor.5 6
The consumer becomes personally liable for the amount only in case of a
refusal to pay the vendor, a refusal to sign and present the vendor a proper
exemption certificate, or, if after presenting such a certificate, he uses the
property so as to destroy the qualifying exemption. Thus, where the record
failed to show any request or demand for payment by the vendor or any
refusal to sign or present an exemption certificate but showed the pay-
ment of all taxes demanded by the vendor, an assessment under the sales
tax was invalid.5 7 However, under the use tax,18 the burden of paying the
tax is upon the one storing or consuming the property, and he is directly
liable for such tax without any assessment on the vendor.59
The sales tax statute60 contemplates that the consumer will furnish to
the vendor a certificate of exemption. A practical question arises concern-
ing the time at which this certificate must be presented in order to avoid
the transaction becoming taxable and the consumer liable for the tax. The
supreme court held that a consumer who supplied the certificates at the
time of payment of invoices submitted to him by the vendor did not refuse
to furmish the certificates and was not therefore liable for the tax."
'Erie R. Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 322, 116 N.E.2d 304 (1953)
t. OHIO REv. CoDE § 5731.01 (B)
'Ornamental Iron Work Co. v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 399, 116 N.E.2d 577 (1953)
OHIO REv. CODE § 5739.13.
UMannen & Roth Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 153, 118 N.E.2d 134 (1954).
s Ohio Revised Code Section 5 41.13, requires a person storing, using or consuming
tangible personal property, subject to the tax, when it is not paid to the seller, to file
a quarterly return showing the price paid, and the tax accruing on such purchases
must be paid by the person making the return.
WMannen & Roth Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 153, 118 N...2d 134 (1954).
oOHio REv. CODE § 5739.03 (B).
¢' Shafer v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 543, 117 N.E.2d 438 (1954).
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Two other decisions dealt with special problems of procedure in sales
tax administration. In Clayton v. Peck62 the tax commissioner, after
examining cash register tapes, made a sales tax deficiency assessment against
the taxpayer, allowing for a percentage of exempt sales as shown by his
examination of the register tapes. His assessment was not held to be un-
lawful in the absence of substantial affirmative proof by the taxpayer that
his allocation was unreasonable. The taxpayer had failed to keep records
of sales under 41 cents and failed to present his own analysis of register
tape data in support of his contention.
The other case held that a party who recovers a refund of sales taxes
illegally or erroneously paid by him is not entitled to recover interest on
the amount of such refund.0 3 The statute is silent on the matter of inter-
estY' In following the majority view in this country on the matter of inter-
est on tax refunds, the court preferred to base its decision upon the fact that
the sole basis for recovery of the refund is the statute, and since the state
makes no provision for the payment of interest, the taxpayer is entitled to
none.
Inheritance Taxation
The Revised Code"5 levies a tax upon the succession to property by deed,
made without a valuable consideration substantially equivalent in money or
money's worth to the full value of the propery, where it is intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. A
gift by deed of real property, with the grantor reserving a life estate therein,
is such a taxable succession 6 The ruling court points out that the vesting
of legal tide is not the significant thing; the question is whether the grantees
did in fact have the right to possess the property. They could neither enjoy
nor possess until the grantor's death; and so the gift was "intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such death."
A court of appeals had reversed a probate court6 7 which had held that
one excepting to the inclusion for estate tax purposes property transferred
two years before the grantor's death without consideration must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer was not made in contem-
plation of death. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals,68 con-
'Clayton v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 245, 118 N.E.2d 540 (1954).
'State ex rel. Cleveland Concession Co. v. Peck, 161 Oluo St. 31, 117 N.E.2d 429
(1954).
, OHIo REv. CODE 5739.07
=OHIo REV. CODE 5 5731.02 (C) (2)
In re Sharps Estate, 120 N.E.2d 511 (Clinton Prob. Ct. 1954).
'OHio REv. CODE § 5731.04.
'In re Walkers Estate, 161 Ohio St. 564, 120 N.E. 2d 432 (1954)
(Spring
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struing the statutory phraseology- "unless shown to the contrary" - as
casting the burden of proof upon the one contending that the transfer was
not in contemplation of death.
The inheritance tax statute provides the highest rate of taxation to
which any given succession is susceptible, such rate being expressed in
terms of the highest rate which would be possible upon the happening of
the remotest contingency or condition.69 In applying this statute to a suc-
cession through a will which provided a gift over to the "heirs of the body of
the nieces and nephews if said nieces and nephews should die prior to the
death of said son, leaving heirs of the body surviving," a court of appeals70
determined that this phraseology created such a possiblity or contingency
thereby subjecting the succession to the highest rate imposed by the in-
heritance tax law.7"
The Code exempts72 from the succession tax gifts to or for the use of an
institution which are to be used for public charity carried on in whole or in
a substantial part within Ohio. In the Ogelbay's Trust case 73 the supreme
court determined that a bequest of the residue of an estate in trust for public
charitable or educational uses and purposes is a gift to "an institution" for
purposes of the exemption statute. Under this trust agreement there was
an overriding geographical limitation on the use of the trust funds, with
at least 50 per cent required to be used for public charitable and educational
activities within Ohio and not more than 50 per cent for public charitable
purposes in West Virginia. It was held, first, that these limitations did
not create two trust estates, and, second, that such a gift was wholly exempt
as being carried on "in substantial part within this state."
The question of the liability of property included in the marital deduc-
tion provided in the federal estate taxi4 for the payment of the federal
estate tax had an interesting history. In Miller v. Hammond7 5 the first Ohio
decision, after the creation of the marital deduction by Congress, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio held that the portion of a testator's estate which the
surviving spouse took under the statute of descent and distribution after elec-
tion not to take under the will, should not be reduced by the deduction
therefrom of federal estate taxes which did not directly result from the
passing of the estate to the surviving spouse. Since the widow was entitled
to but one-third of the decedents estate, this was less than the maximum
c O-io REv. CODE § 5731.28.
"'In re Estate of Coyle 122 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio App. 1954).T 1OHio REv. CODE S 5331.12 (C).
7Oi-o REv. CODE § 5731.09.
162 Ohio St. 1, 120 N.E.2d 437 (1954).
7 INT. REv. CODE § 2056 (1954).
156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
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marital deduction allowable, and therefore there was no federal estate tax
deductible. This holding resulted in elevating the "marital deduction" to
the status of an "exemption."
This was the status of the law until the recent decision of the supreme
court in Campbell v. Lloyd.76  In overruling Miller v. Hammond on its
basic "exemption" theory the court reexamined the pertinent statutes gov-
erning the distribution of decedents' estates, and reverted to its former
positon,77 that, in determining the value of the succession of any bene-
ficiary, the amount of the federal estate tax should first be deducted, like
other debts and expenses of administration. Thus, a widow electing to
take under the statute of descent and distribution takes subject to federal
estate tax, and the amount she will take will be computed after the deduction
of the federal estate tax.
The above decisions were concerned with the situation of a spouse tak-
ing against a will. The probate judge who originally decided the Miller v.
Hammond case having been reversed by Campbell v. Lloyd at the time of
his decision, was called upon to decide the question of the liability of the
widow's share for payment of federal estate taxes where she took under the
will.78 The will contained no provision for the payment of federal estate
taxes. Under the will the widow received a specific bequest of a restaurant
business, and shared equally with testator's sister in the residue of his
estate. There were also some non-probate assets which the widow claimed
in her marital deduction. As to these the court felt bound by the Miller
decision since they were analogized to intestate property. These assets
were held to pass free from the burden of the federal estate tax. The burden
of these taxes fell upon the residuary estate. The restaurant bequest was
also held to pass free from the burden of the federal tax which had to be
taken out of the residue. The probate court, however, did not feel bound
by the Miller case in deciding the liability of the widow's share of the resid-
uary estate. Accordingly, it ruled that the tax must be deducted from the
residue before she received her half of the remaining residue. Finally, the
sister was required to pay her proportionate share of the federal estate taxes
on the non-probate assets received by her (insurance and jointly owned
property), applying the rule of equitable apportionment of the federal tax
burden between the probate and the non-probate assets, announced in
McDougall i). Central Nattonal Bank.79
In view of the reversal of position by the supreme court in Campbell v.
"162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954)
'Tax Commission ex. rel Price, Atty. Gen'l. v. Lamprecht, 107 Ohio St. 535, 140
N.E.2d 333 (1923)
Foerster v. Foerster, 122 N.E.2d 314 (Franklin Prob. Ct. 1954)
"157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
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Lloyd, it would appear that the foregoing probate decision should be modi-
fied to conform to the later rule announced by the supreme court as to the
liability of intestate property to the federal estate tax.
Finally, the supreme court8 ° has applied the principle of Campbell v.
Lloyd to the liability of property passing, under provision of a will, to
charities. Certain charities were beneficiaries along with noncharitable
legatees in the residuary estate of Susan Manning Ball. The court of ap-
peals had held that the charitable legatees should be paid their legacies free
of federal estate taxes, leaving the entire burden of the tax to fall upon the
noncharitable legatees. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals. This left in effect the probate judgment which was that
all residuary legatees, including the charities, should bear the burden of the
tax.
Unemployment Compensation
Two appeals from the decisions of the Administrator of the Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation concerning tax problems were decided. In
one case the administrator was upheld in his decision that two partnerships,
located in the same building, having the same address, same telephone and
same management, engaged in the printing business and having common
membership were to be treated as a single employer and given but one
rate in determining contributions due.8 ' In the other case,8 2 involving a
transfer of a major portion of a business prior to the amendment of the
law in 1952, the court affirmed the administrator in his holding that the
entire business of the transferor must have been acquired before the suc-
cessor could use the transferor's merit rating for the payment of contribu-
tions. The statute now uses this less stringent language: "If an employer
acquires substantially all of the assets used in trade of business of another
employer.
Corporate Excise
A recent decision under the Ohio franchise tax on Ohio corporations for
profit, held that a fair construction of the applicable Ohio statutes required
the inclusion in the total value of a corporation's issued and outstanding
shares of stock, of all capital, surplus, undivided profits and reserves with-
out deduction therefrom of the value of any federal securities which might
be included therein. 3
" H.I1 v. Ball, 162 Olho St. 299, 123 N.E.2d 259 (1954).
" Church Budget Envelope Co. v. Cornell, 119 N.E.2d 316 (Franklin Com. P1.
1954).
'Apex Smelting Co. v. Cornell, 121 N.E.2d 571 (Franklin Corn. Pl. 1954).
' OHIO REy. CODE § 4141.24.
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City Income Tax
An income tax levied by Cincinnati was charged with retroactivity,
discrimination and inequality in a suit to enjoin enforcement of it. In
substance the ordinance imposed a tax of one per cent on gross salaries,
wages, collections and other compensations earned during the period of
April 1, 1954 to October 31, 1954, and one per cent on the net profits
of corporations, businesses and professions, earned during the months of
April to October inclusive which shall not be less than 7/12 of the net
profits of such taxpayer for the entire calendar year 1954. An order was
issued restraining the levy and collection from plaintiff.8 4
Tax Procedure
In connection with the authorization 5 that a written petition for re-
assessment of sales taxes may be filed in person or by registered mail with-
in 30 days after service of the deficiency assessment, it was held that a
petition sent in by registered mail was filed on the date of mailing rather
than the date of receipt. 6
In light of the statute providing for appeals from the determinations of
the tax commissioner to the Board of Tax Appeals which requires that the
notice of appeal have attached thereto a true copy of the notice sent by
the commissioner to the taxpayer of the final determination complained
of,87 the court of appeals held that a copy of the commissioner's findings is
jurisdictional and that the Board could lawfully dismiss an appeal not
having the attachment.88
It has also been held that a county board of revision was not a proper
party to object to an allegedly erroneous decision on valuation by the Board
of Tax Appeals, pointing out that the right of appeal is confined to a party
prejudiced by the decision, a taxpayer.89
The statute providing for an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from
the tax commissioner requires that the notice of appeal shall specify the
errors complained of. A notice of appeal which does not enumerate in
definite and specific terms the precise errors claimed, rather using very
broad and general language, is insufficient to meet the demands of the
statute, and the board may lawfully dismiss such an appeal for want of juris-
Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 169, 118 N.E.2d 398 (1954).
Clark v. City of Cincinnati, 121 N.E.2d 834 (Hamilton Com. P1. 1954).
"OHIO REV. CODE § 5739.13.
St State ex rel. Sherrick v. Peck, 118 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio App. 1951)
8"OHio REV. CODE § 5717.02.
"David v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 80, 118 N.E.2d 146 (1954).
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